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1. Introduction
In recent years genetic tests have developed rapidly. These tests enable the
prediction of a higher than normal risk of developing specific diseases. For
insurers genetic tests constitute new possibilities for more precise risk classifi-
cation of their clients. However, these developments have started a debate on
whether insurance companies should be allowed to use genetic information to
calculate premia according to an applicant’s genetic risk: to many people it
seems unfair charging individuals identified with a higher than average risk of
developing severe diseases substantially higher insurance premia.
Despite the intensive political discussion, the theoretical literature on ge-
netic testing and health insurance has remained rather limited (Tabarrok
(1994), Doherty and Thistle (1996), Doherty and Posey (1998), Strohmenger
and Wambach (2000), Andersson (2001), Hoel and Iverson (2002), Hoy et al.
(2003), Hoel et al (2006)). All of these papers consider Rothschild and Stiglitz
(1976) type static one-period insurance markets and analyze the effects of
genetic testing on the risk categorization of individuals in the spirit of Hoy
(1982).
It is obvious, however, that genetic information may also allow inter-
temporal discrimination. Information about parents’ genes may allow an in-
surer to screen their offspring. If the parents carried the good gene, their
children are less likely to develop a disease than if the parents carried the bad
gene.1 For example, every child of a person with Huntington’s disease has a
50% chance of inheriting the gene mutation and developing the disease. In-
surers use information on family medical history in underwriting decisions for
children of Huntington’s sufferers. Because each child has a 50% chance of
early mortality, such children find it difficult to obtain insurance; and when
they do, premiums are typically quite high; see Manson and Conko (2007) and
Gutie´rrez and Macdonald (2002). Obviously, such inter-temporal screening
based on family medical history can also be achieved by conditioning on the
parents’ genetic status. Accordingly, it may be profitable for insurers to quote
the offspring of good-gene carriers better rates than the offspring of bad-gene
carriers. The purpose of this paper is to analyze the impact of genetic testing
1Inheritance of genetic diseases refers to whether the condition is inherited from the
parents or “runs” in families. The level of inheritance of a condition depends on how im-
portant genetics are to the disease. Strongly genetic diseases are usually inherited, partially
genetic diseases are sometimes inherited, and non-genetic diseases are not inherited; see,
e.g., www.wrongdiagnosis.com/g/genetic/inherit.htm.
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when such inter-temporal discrimination is possible.
In our model agents carry a good or a bad gene. Agents with the bad
gene are more likely to develop a disease than agents with the good gene. We
normalize the cost of treating the disease to one so that the fair price for full
insurance equals the probability of developing the disease.
We consider successive generations of individuals carrying the good or the
bad gene. Reproduction is asexual. Daughters are more likely to inherit their
mother’s gene. The fractions of the good- and bad-gene carriers are constant
through time.
Risk averse individuals must purchase full insurance. They are not altru-
istic, i.e., they do not care about the well-being of their offspring. Agents do
not know which genes they carry. However, insurers can perform a test which
reveals an agent’s genes. Insurers quote prices for the mandatory insurance
which may be unconditional or depend on the agent’s or her ancestors’ test re-
sults. Test results and insurance rates are non-verifiable, i.e., it is not possible
that an agent passes on information from one insurer to another. Moreover,
descendants of a tested generation have no information about their ancestors’
test results. Insurers engage in price competition.
Insurers cannot attract agents with non-loss making quotes conditional on
the agents’ genetic status. Competition ensures that a fair one-period pooling
quote is available under which the individual is fully insured. Prices conditional
on the genetic status expose the agent to premium risk to which she is averse.
Accordingly, agents prefer the unconditional pooling contract; see Tabarrok
(1994) or Doherty and Thistle (1996).
Nevertheless, an insurer can exploit the fact that agents are not altruistic.
With a multi-period pricing strategy, the insurer can induce mothers to take
the test and then use this information to profitably screen their offspring.
Our equilibria have the following structure: An insurer bribes the first
generation to take the test with an unconditional quote which is below their
average probability to fall sick; the insurer makes losses on the first generation.
The insurer then uses this information about generation one to profitably
screen their offspring. The offspring of the bad-gene carriers get fair quotes;
the insurer breaks even on this group. By contrast, the offspring of the good-
gene carriers get unfair quotes, and the insurer makes a profit on them. Price
competition ensures that these profits equal the subsidy given to the first
generation so that the net present value of expected profits is zero. Moreover,
due to competition the price charged to the offspring of good-gene carriers is
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constant through time and equal to the price charged to the tested generation
one. Insurers use the information about generation one to profitably screen
a finite number of generations of their offspring. When the last offspring
generation has been screened, the process starts all over again with the testing
of the next generation.
Comparing these inter-temporal screening equilibria to fair unconditional
pooling in each period, one sees that the tested generation is clearly better off:
they pay a price below their average probability of contracting the disease. The
offspring of agents carrying good genes pay a price above their probability of
developing the disease; they subsidize the tested generation. Nevertheless,
they are still better off than under unconditional pooling. The offspring of
mothers with the bad gene are worse off than under unconditional pooling:
they pay the price reflecting their higher than average risk of developing the
disease. Since the information about a mother’s bad gene becomes less precise
as one moves down the family tree, daughters of tested mothers pay a higher
price than granddaughters and so on.
Our model is related to the set-up of Kunreuther and Pauly (1985).2 In
their model insurance firms learn about their customers’ risks by observing
claim records over time. An insurer has an information advantage on his
established customers compared to his competitors. Kunreuther and Pauly
analyze how the insurer can exploit this advantage in a competitive market.
In their model a consumer’s risk is constant through time. The insurer learns
the risk over time and adjusts premia accordingly. In our set-up the mother’s
risk is only an imprecise signal of her daughter’s risk. Through the test an
insurer precisely learns the mother’s risk. The content of this information
deteriorates over time, however. Kunreuther and Pauly’s equilibrium shares
with our equilibrium the lowballing feature: new customers are attracted at
a loss, while the insurer extracts rent from established customers.3 In our
framework mothers are induced to take the test at a loss; the offspring of
mothers with the good gene are exploited profitably.
The paper is organized as follows. The next section introduces the basic
model. In section three we introduce the genetic test. As a preliminary step we
first consider the scenario where information about the genes of mothers may
only be used to screen daughters. Granddaughters have to be tested anew.
In the next subsection we allow the genetic information to be used for any
2See also Nilssen (2000).
3The term lowballing is due to D’Arcy and Doherty (1990).
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number of generations of the offspring. Section 4 concludes.
2. The Model
We consider successive generations t = 1, 2, . . . of individuals. Each generation
lives for one period. Each member i ∈ [0, 1] of generation t (mother) has
exactly one offspring (daughter) also named i. The size of all generations is
thus the same. We normalize the size of the generations to 1, i.e., f([0, 1]) = 1,
where f is Lebesgue measure.4
An individual’s health statusH can be good g or bad b, i.e., H(i, t) ∈ {g, b}.
The health status, in turn, is determined by the genetic status G, which can be
of type ` or h, i.e., G(i, t) ∈ {`, h}. If an individual is of type h, the probability
of being in health status b is h ∈ (0, 1); if she is of type `, the probability is
` ∈ (0, h), i.e., lower than for the h-types. Denote the members of generation
t with the `-gene by `t and the ones with the h-gene by ht. Let the fraction
of the h-types in generation 1 be f(h1) < 1/2, and the fraction of the `-types
accordingly f(`1) = 1− f(h1).
Let us now turn to the passing on of genes. Denote by φ`` the transition
probability that the daughter is of type ` given her mother is of type `, by φh`
the probability that the daughter is of type h if her mother is of type `, and
accordingly, φ`h and φhh for the h-type mothers. These transition probabilities
are constant through time.
A daughter is more likely to be of type ` if her mother is of this type;
likewise, she is more likely to be of type h if her mother is as well. A daughter
can, however, also be of the opposite genetic type as her mother. Formally,
1 > φ`` > φh` > 0 which implies φ`` > 1/2; 1 > φhh > φ`h > 0 so that
φhh > 1/2.
Let φh` = φ`hf(ht)/f(`t), t = 1, 2, . . . . Then we have f(ht+1) = f(ht) :=
f(h) and f(`t+1) = f(`t) := f(`), t = 1, 2, . . . ; that is, the fraction of `- and
h-gene carriers are constant through time.5
To illustrate, consider the following example: f(`) = 3/4, φ`` = 8/9, and
φhh = 2/3. We will use this example throughout the text. A summary of the
example with explicit derivations is given in the Appendix.
To sum up: We consider generations of size 1 in which the fractions of
`- and h-gene carriers are constant through time. The average probability to
4For the sake of simplicity we consider a society with asexual reproduction; see, e.g.,
Becker and Tomes (1979).
5To see this, consider, e.g., f(ht+1) = f(ht+1∩ht)+f(ht+1∩`t) = f(ht)φhh+f(`t)φh` =
f(ht)φhh + f(`t)φ`hf(ht)/f(`t) = f(ht).
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develop the disease is the same in each generation and equals p(H(i, t) = b) =
f(h)h+ f(`)` := p¯. Let h = 1/2 and ` = 1/4 so that in our example p¯ = 5/16.
If an individual is in bad condition b, she is sick and needs treatment. We
normalize the cost of treating the disease to 1. Individuals are risk averse
which is represented by their utility function U(·) over income with U ′ > 0
and U ′′ < 0.6 Individuals have initial income M > 1. To keep matters simple
we assume that insurance is mandatory and equal to the size of the treatment,
i.e., individuals must purchase full insurance.7 Individuals do not know which
genes they carry. We further assume that agents are not altruistic, i.e., mothers
do not care about the well-being of their offspring.8
Let us now turn to the insurers. We want to focus on equilibria in the spirit
of Rothschild and Stiglitz (1976): The contracts that are offered in equilibrium
make zero profits, and there exists no other contract that can generate positive
profits given the equilibrium ones. We therefore set up a game having a Nash-
equilibrium with the Rothschild and Stiglitz characteristics.
The mandatory insurance of 1 is provided by n > 2 insurance companies.
Insurer j, j = 1, . . . , n, quotes qjt (·) for the mandatory insurance in period t
or remains inactive. The quotes may be unconditional or they may depend
on the result of a genetic test which we describe in the next section. We
will specify the contracts we allow for in detail below. In each period insurer
1 moves first; insurer 2 observes 1’s choice and then moves second, and so
on. Finally, consumers choose the most attractive contract; if consumers are
indifferent between the offers of two insurers, they buy from the first mover.
Insurers are risk neutral. They maximize the sum of expected profits over
time. For the ease of exposition we set the discount rate to zero. Due to
price competition equilibrium profits will be zero. If an insurer is indifferent
between being inactive yielding zero profits or being active having customers
and making zero profits, he opts for being active; moreover, a firm prefers to
be inactive to offering contracts that attract no customers.9
6Our utility function is thus state independent. For an analysis with state contingent
utility functions see Strohmenger and Wambach (2000).
7Note that our mandatory insurance differs from the compulsory insurance in Hoel and
Iversen (2002). There all agents pay the same price but the insurance may be less than
complete. In our set-up insurance is full, yet prices may depend on individual risk.
8For our results to hold it is sufficient that mothers care less about their daughters’
well-being than their own; see the discussion in the Conclusions.
9Under these assumptions along the equilibrium path insurer 1 offers a quote generating
zero profits while the other insurers remain inactive. Since insurer 1 serves the entire market,
in equilibrium the other insurers have no customers and thus opt to be inactive. If insurer 1
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Without the genetic test neither the first generation’s insured know which
genes they carry nor do insurers, implying that any discrimination among
agents of generation 1 is impossible. From the second generation on insurers
could try to condition their quotes on the medical history of an agent’s an-
cestors. To focus on the role of genetic tests, we rule out this possibility.10
Therefore, without the genetic test the insurers can offer only unconditional
quotes in each period. We also rule out history-dependant strategies which
might support collusion. Each period insurer j, j = 1, . . . , n, will offer an
unconditional quote qjt for the mandatory insurance of 1 or remain inactive.
Proposition 1: Along the equilibrium path insurer 1 offers q1t = p¯, t =
1, 2, . . . while insurers 2, . . . , n are inactive in each period.
Proof: In equilibrium insurer 1 serves the whole market in each period and
makes zero profits. Since we rule out history-dependant strategies, it suffices
to consider possible deviations in one period, say period 1. Insurer 1 will not
charge a lower price because this entails losses. If insurer 1 quotes q11 > p¯,
insurer 2 quotes q21 = p¯. To see this, consider insurer n − 1. If he charges a
price above p¯, he will be undercut by insurer n and end up with no customers.
Since firm n − 1 prefers being active, he will charge p¯. Working backwards
yields that firm 2 charges p¯, and so does insurer 1. Therefore, insurer 1 has no
incentive to deviate. Given insurer 1’s equilibrium quote, the other insurers
cannot attract consumers with a non-loss-making quote. Thus they’d rather
stay inactive. 
In our example insurer 1 offers the pooling rate of 5/16 each period. Under
perfect information the `-types would pay 1/4 while the h-types would be
charged 1/2. Accordingly, the h-types benefit from asymmetric information:
they are subsidized by the `-types.
deviates from his equilibrium contract, insurer 2’s equilibrium strategy specifies a contract
generating zero-profits given insurer 1’s out-of-equilibrium offer. See, e.g. the proof of
Proposition 1. Kunreuther and Pauly (1985) also use this Stackelberg leader-follower model
to derive Rothschild and Stiglitz type of equilibria.
10See, e.g., Kunreuther and Pauly (1985) for an analysis of such an experience rating.
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3. Genetic Test
Now assume a genetic test becomes available that reveals an individual’s genes.
We consider the case where only insurance companies can perform the test.11
Let the test be costless. If an agent is tested, the insurer can condition his quote
on her genetic status. Moreover, the quotes for the individual’s descendants
can also depend on the agent’s test result. The test results and the insurance
quotes are non-verifiable. This means that a consumer cannot use test results
and quotes from, say, insurer 1 to get favorable rates from another insurer. To
put this differently, if insurer 1 has tested an agent, he has a monopoly on this
information which he can try to exploit over time. Moreover, we assume that
descendants of a tested generation have no information about the test result,
be it directly or indirectly through the quotes they get. Each generation has
the same priors about its genetic status as generation 1.12
If, say, a period 1 agent accepts a conditional quote by an insurer, she
commits to buy the insurance from this insurer even when the test shows that
she carries the h-gene. It is thus not possible for a consumer to take the test
with one insurer and switch to another insurer offering, say, a pooling contract
if the test result is unfavorable.13 Note that this assumption does not imply
that the agent’s descendants must buy insurance from this company. They
are free to choose from all offers on the market. The only constraint a period
2 agent faces is that if she accepts a conditional quote in period 2, she has to
buy this contract.
First note that it is not possible to attract individuals with a one-period
contract conditional on the test results qjt = (q
j
t (G(i, t) = `), q
j
t (G(i, t) =
h)) := (qjt (`
t), qjt (h
t)) with qjt (`
t) 6= qjt (ht). In particular, prices q1t (`t) < p¯ <
11If the agents can take the test, the test results will also become known to the insurers.
If the test shows the `-gene, an agent will happily release this information to the insurer. If
the test result is h, the information will be kept secret. Accordingly, those individuals who
do not reveal their test are potentially at high risk. See Tabarrok (1994) and Doherty and
Thistle (1996).
12If, say, agents of generation 2 are aware of their mother’s genetic status, they know
whether they have a high or a low probability of falling ill. An insurer who doesn’t know
the mothers’ test results can screen the two groups by offering, e.g., contracts exposing
agents to some price risk as described in Lemma 1; daughters of ` mothers are more willing
to accept the risk than daughters of h mothers. To keep the model tractable, we rule out
this possibility.
13If this kind of shopping were allowed for, unconditional pooling offers are not possible:
only h-gene carriers would demand the pooling contract rendering it unprofitable. See, e.g.,
Emons (2001) for an analysis of such a shopping behavior by consumers in the presence of
imperfect tests.
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q1t (h
t) where the agent gets a better quote if she has the `-gene than if she
carries the h-gene attract no customers.
Lemma 1: No firm offers a one-period contract qjt = (q
j
t (`
t), qjt (h
t)) with
qjt (`
t) 6= qjt (ht) in equilibrium.
Proof: Suppose insurer 1 tries to attract individuals with prices q1t (`
t) 6= q1t (ht)
conditional on the test outcome. If consumers accept this contract, they have
to buy insurance from firm 1. Since all agents of generation t have the same
priors, they either all buy the contract or nobody does. If they accept the
offer, firm 1 thus has customers of both types and will offer only quotes that
do not yield expected losses, i.e., f(h)q1t (h
t) + f(`)q1t (`
t) ≥ p¯.
Then insurer 2 will offer the unconditional contract q2t = p¯. With insurer
2’s quote the individual’s utility is U(M − p¯): the agent is fully insured and
bears no risk at all. With 1’s conditional prices the expected utility amounts
to f(`)U(M−q1t (`t))+f(h)U(M−q1t (ht)): the agent is fully insured but bears
the price risk generated by the genetic test. Jensen’s inequality together with
the fact that the conditional prices do not yield losses imply that the agents
are better off with the fair pooling quote p¯. 
Conditional pricing introduces risk to which the agents are averse. Consumers
prefer unconditional pooling; see Tabarrok (1994).
Given that a one-period pricing strategy conditional on the test results
does not work out, an insurer can try to exploit the fact that agents are not
altruistic. With a multi-period pricing strategy he can try to induce mothers to
take the test and then use this information to profitably screen their offspring.
To induce agents of generation t to take the test, insurer 1 must offer them
terms generating at least the expected utility of U(M− p¯); otherwise insurer 2
can attract this generation with an unconditional pooling offer. Since agents
are risk averse and insurers risk neutral, the best way to achieve this is by
requiring to take the test and then quoting q1t ≤ p¯ which is not conditional on
the test outcome. For the agents’ daughters the insurer then quotes q1t+1 =
(q1t+1(G((i, t) = `), q
1
t+1(G(i, t) = h)) := (q
1
t+1(`
t), q1t+1(h
t)), for their grand-
daughters q1t+2 = (q
1
t+2(G(i, t) = `), q
1
t+2(G(i, t) = h)) := (q
1
t+2(`
t), q1t+2(h
t)),
and so on.
3.1 Two-period Pricing Strategy
To fix ideas, suppose insurer j induces generation 1 to take the test and then
uses the genetic information about mothers to make a profit on their daughters.
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The insurer may not use the information about mothers to screen granddaugh-
ters. He has to start the process again by testing granddaughters. We consider
at the moment only such two-period pricing strategies (qjt ,q
j
t+1) together with
the one-period pricing strategy qjt , i.e., unconditional pooling. We will drop
this assumption in the next section.
We will now construct an equilibrium where insurer 1 offers the same two-
period contract in each odd period. The contract breaks even over the two
generations. The other insurers remain inactive. Given insurer 1’s offer, they
cannot profitably enter with a one- or two-period contract.
Company 1 offers quotes q11 and q
1
2 = (q
1
2(`
1), q12(h
1)). Here q11 is the
quote for generation 1 given they take the test; q12(`
1) [q12(h
1)] is the quote
for daughters whose mothers were of type ` [h]. To determine profits we need
to define the daughter’s probability of falling ill conditional on the mother’s
genetic status p(H(i, 2) = b|G(i, 1) = `) = `φ`` + hφh` := p(b2|`1) and
p(H(i, 2) = b|G(i, 1) = h) = `φ`h + hφhh := p(b2|h1). In our example
p(b2|`1) = 5/18 and p(b2|h1) = 5/12.
With this two-period pricing strategy, the insurer’s profits amount to
pi11 = q
1
1 − p¯ and
pi12 = [q
1
2(`
1)− p(b2|`1)]f(`) + [q12(h1)− p(b2|h1)]f(h).
The second period profit is explained as follows: There are f(`) [f(h)] daugh-
ters whose mothers had the `- [h]-gene. The insurer’s profits on the first group
is the quote q12(`
1) minus the expected probability of developing the disease
conditional on the mothers’ `-genes p(b2|`1); for the second group profits are
the quote q12(h
1) minus the expected probability of developing the disease con-
ditional on the mothers’ h-genes p(b2|h1).
Let us first consider the quote q12(h
1) the insurer charges daughters whose
mothers were of type h. Recall that in our equilibrium we construct the quote
q12(`
1) in such a way that the agents with type `-mothers buy from firm 1.
Insurer 1 will not charge q12(h
1) < p(b2|h1) because this reduces his period two
profit. If q12(h
1) > p(b2|h1), firm 2 will offer q22 = p(b2|h1). Given daughters
with `-mothers buy from insurer 1, insurer 2 attracts only daughters of h-
mothers and breaks even with his quote. Accordingly, q12(h
1) ≥ p(b2|h1). If
the equality holds, the insurer serves this group while making zero profits; if
the inequality is strict, he loses this group and also makes zero profits. Thus,
quoting q12(h
1) = p(b2|h1) and serving this group is an equilibrium action.
Hence, insurer 1 can only make a profit on agents with type `-mothers.
This profit is constrained, however. First note that q12(`
1) ≤ p¯. If this were
9
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not the case, company 2 will offer the unconditional quote q22 = p¯. He attracts
the whole generation 2 and makes zero-profits. Firm 1 would end up with no
customers in period 2.
Yet q12(`
1) is further restricted by q11. To see this, suppose insurer 1 makes
zero profits with his two-period pricing strategy (q11,q
1
2 = (q
1
2(`
1), p(b2|h1))),
i.e., pi11 + pi
1
2 = 0. Now let q
1
2(`
1) > q11. Then insurer 2 offers (q
2
2,q
2
3 =
(q22, p(b
3|h2)) where q22 is such that pi22+pi23 = 0. Since both two-period contracts
break even and q12(`
1) > q11, we have q
2
2 < q
1
2(`
1)). Thus insurer 2 attracts both
groups in period 2 who happily take the test, and breaks even over the two
periods. Insurer 1 has no period-two customers and overall suffers losses.
Consequently, the equilibrium contract has the feature q12(`
1) = q11 and
must generate expected zero profits. Formally, pi11 = q
1
1 − p¯, pi12 = [q11 −
p(b2|`1)]f(l), and pi1 + pi2 = 0. Solving for q11 yields
q11 =
p¯+ f(`)p(b2|`1)
1 + f(`)
. (1)
If insurer 1 offers this contract, no other insurer can attract customers in period
1 or 2 with a non-loss making offer. If insurer 1 deviates he either makes losses
or has no customers.
To summarize our findings:
Proposition 2: Suppose firms are restricted to one- and two-period pricing
strategies. Then there exists an equilibrium where along the equilibrium path
firm 1 charges generation 1 q11 as defined by (1) and generation 2 q
1
2(`
1) =
q11, q
1
2(h
1) = p(b2|h1). The process starts all over again with generations
3, 5, . . . . Firm 1 serves the entire market and the other firms are inactive.
The quote q12(`
1) = q11 is unfair and the insurer makes a profit on the
daughters whose mothers had the good gene. This group is free to switch to
another insurer. Yet no other insurer can make a better offer to them. The
competition has no information about the second generation and thus can only
offer unconditional pooling or the equilibrium set of contracts. Unconditional
pooling is worse for this group. Offering the equilibrium set of contracts, i.e.,
offering the subsidized rate conditional on taking the test and exploiting the
information in the next generation doesn’t attract customers either. By testing
the first generation, insurer 1 obtains a monopoly for the information about
their genetic status which he uses to exploit the daughters of the good-gene
mothers. Bertrand competition ensures that the price the insurer pays for
10
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obtaining this monopoly equals the profit it makes in the second round having
this monopoly. The equilibrium is thus of the lowballing type.
In each odd period, say period 1, firm 1 induces all agents to take the test
at a quote q11 below the average probability to fall sick p¯. In our example
q11 = 75/252 < 5/16 = p¯ and pi
1
1 = −15/1008. In each even period the insurer
recoups his investment with the daughters whose mothers had the `-gene,
p(b2|`1) < q12(`1) = q11. In our example p(b2|`1) = 5/18 and pi12 = 15/1008.
Let us use the example to show that in equilibrium indeed q12(`
1) = q11.
Suppose on the contrary that insurer 1 charges, e.g., q11 = 291/1008 < 75/252
and q12(`
1) = 78/252. With these prices pi11 + pi
1
2 = 0. Yet now insurer 2
will offer the equilibrium contract q22 = 75/252 and q
2
3 = (75/252; 5/12). He
attracts both groups in period 2 and everybody takes the test. His profits in
period 3 on daughters of `-mothers compensate his losses from period 2.
Let us compare this two-period pricing equilibrium with the one-period one
where firms charge p¯ in each period. The tested generations are clearly better
off because they pay a price below their average probability of becoming sick.
By paying the price q11 above their probability of falling ill p(b
2|`1), daughters
of type `-mothers cross-subsidize the entire preceding generation. Yet they
are still better off than under one-period pooling. By contrast, daughters of
type h-mothers are worse off than in the one-period pooling equilibrium. To
summarize: In the two-period pricing equilibrium the tested generations and
their offspring with type `-mothers gain at the expense of their descendants
with type h-mothers.
3.2. Arbitrary Pricing Strategies
We have seen that the two-period pricing strategy drives out the one-period
one. The next question to ask is whether insurer 1 should use his informational
advantage about generation 1 for generations 3, 4, . . . as well. To answer this
question we allow now for arbitrary pricing policies.
As a first step we define k-period pricing policies starting from generation
1 on. Under such a policy generation 1 is tested and their genetic information
is then used on (k − 1) generations of their offspring. Define p(H(i, t) =
b|G(i, 1) = `) := p(bt|`1), t = 2, . . . .
Definition 1: A k-period pricing policy is given as follows. For k = 2, 3, . . .
the quotes q1,k, qt,k = (q1,k, p(b
t|h1)), give rise to profits pi1 = p¯ − q1,k and
pit = [q1,k − p(bt|`1)]f(`), t = 2, . . . , k. The zero profit condition
∑k
t=1 pit = 0
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then gives us
q1,k =
p¯+ f(`)
∑k
t=2 p(b
t|`1)
1 + (k − 1)f(`) . (2)
Let q1,1 = p¯; with one-period pricing only unconditional pooling is possible.
We have defined k-period pricing rather narrowly. We have already taken
into account that k-period pricing must lead to zero profits. Moreover, we have
determined q1,k such that it is an equilibrium if only one-period and k-period
pricing are allowed for. A firm offering q1,k as defined by (2) cannot be driven
out of the market by the one-period pooling price q1,1 = p¯. We have q1,k < p¯
because p(bk|`1) < p¯ for all k = 2, 3, . . . .
It is, however, unclear which k-period pricing policy firms will follow. If,
e.g., q1,3 > q1,4, a firm with the 3-period pricing policy will be driven out of
the market by a firm using the 4-period one. In a second step we analyze,
therefore, the prices q1,k, k = 1, 2 . . . in detail. It turns out that these prices
are U-shaped in k.
Lemma 2: The set of quotes {q1,k}, k = 1, 2, . . . , defined by (2) is U-shaped
in k and attains its minimum at some finite κ ≥ 2.
Proof: Straightforward computations show that q1,1 = p¯ > q1,2. Next note
that
q1,k < (≥) q1,k+1 ⇔
p¯− p(bk+1|`1) < (≥) f(`)[(k − 1)p(bk+1|`1)−
k∑
t=2
p(bt|`1)], k = 2, 3, . . . .
The LHS is positive and monotonically decreasing in k with limk→∞ LHS = 0.
The RHS is positive and increasing in k. Consequently, either κ = 2 or it is
defined by the k where the strict inequality first holds. q1,k is decreasing in k
for k < κ and increasing for k > κ. 
Lemma 2 states that a κ-period pricing strategy leads to the lowest price
q1,k that can be charged to the tested generation 1 and all (k − 1) descen-
dant generations of the `1-types. In our example κ = 3. We have p¯ =
5/16, p(b2|`1) = 5/18, p(b3|`1) = 95/324, p(b4|`1) = 220/729, q1,1 = 5/16, q1,2 =
75/252, q1,3 = 8/27, and q1,4 = 2820/9427 > q1,3.
Increasing the pricing strategy from k to k + 1 increases profits by pik+1 =
(q1,k+1 − p(bk+1|`1))f(`). If pik+1 > 0, the profits made on the descendants of
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types `1 increase. Hence, q1,k+1 < q1,k. The tested generation gets a larger
cross-subsidy so that total profits sum up to zero.
Conversely, if pik+1 < 0, q1,k+1 > q1,k. The profits made on the offspring of
types `1 decreases and so does the subsidy for the tested generation. Straight-
forward computations show that pik+1 < 0 is equivalent to q1,k < p(b
k+1|`1).
If the price q1,k charged under k-period pricing is lower than the conditional
probability of falling ill of generation k+1, adding this cohort lowers the profits
made on the descendants of types `1’s. The existence of such a critical cohort
is ensured because p(bk+1|`1) converges to p¯ as k becomes large.
To put it differently: The informational advantage of having tested gener-
ation 1 dissipates with successive generations: p(bk+1|`1) increases with k and
converges to p¯. Adding additional generations to the pricing strategy becomes
less and less attractive as one moves down the family tree.
As long as it is profitable to add a generation to the pricing policy, the price
q11 falls. If the additional generation adds to profits made on the offspring of
the tested generation 1, the price q11 has to fall so that overall profits sum up to
zero. Yet, there is some generation (κ+ 1) where p(bκ+1|`1) exceeds the price
q1,κ charged under the κ-period pricing policy. Adding this generation to the
pricing policy lowers profits made on the offspring and actually increases q1.
This reasoning is similar to the well-known textbook result that average costs
are decreasing as long as they are higher than marginal costs and increasing
when the are smaller than marginal costs.
It is now clear what an equilibrium looks like:
Proposition 3: Suppose firms are restricted to k-period pricing policies as
defined in Definition 1. Then there exists an equilibrium where along the
equilibrium path firm 1 follows a κ-period pricing policy with κ defined by
Lemma 2. It charges the first generation q11,κ as defined by (2) and its off-
springs q1t,κ(`
1) = q11,κ, q
1
t,κ(h
1) = p(bt|h1), t = 2, . . . , κ. The procedure starts
all over again with generations κ + 1, 2κ + 1, . . . . Firm 1 serves the entire
market and the other firms are inactive.
If firm 1 charges q1,κ, it cannot be driven out of the market by another
pricing policy because they all command higher prices. Let us compare the
κ-period pricing equilibrium to the one-period pooling equilibrium q1,1 = p¯.
The advantage of the tested generation 1 and the descendants of the types
`1 is greatest because q1,κ is minimal. Bertrand competition ensures that the
surplus of these groups is maximized.
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What about the offspring of the types h1? They are worse off than under
under pooling because p(bt|h1) > p¯, t = 2, 3, . . . . Note that p(bt|h1) is de-
creasing in t. Generation (t+ 1) gets a lower quote than generation t because
the information about them from their ancestor is less precise. Accordingly,
daughters of tested h-mothers suffer more than granddaughters and so on if
genetic tests become available.
4. Conclusions
The purpose of this paper is to analyze inter-temporal screening through ge-
netic tests. We show that generation one is bribed to take the test with
an unconditional quote. The insurer then uses this information to profitably
screen a finite number of generations of their offspring. The offspring of good-
gene carriers subsidize the tested generation. Yet they are still better off than
under unconditional pooling. The offspring of bad-gene carriers lose compared
to pooling because they have to pay a price reflecting their higher than average
risk of developing the disease.
In this paper we abstract from many important aspects of genetic tests in
health insurance markets. We assume that only insurers can take the test. The
test results and the insurance rates are non-verifiable so that the information
cannot be passed on to other insurers. The testing insurance company thus
has a monopoly on the information, which it can exploit over time. Agents
cannot take the test themselves so that we do not run into the problems of
strategic revelation of the results.14 Moreover, the assumption of compulsory
complete insurance rules out further screening possibilities of the insurers.
Finally, since we discuss generations, the time dimension will be measured
in terms of decades. Technological advances will likely occur over this kind
of epoch of time which may render the informational advantage of the test
obsolete.
The assumption that agents are non-altruistic is, on the other hand, not
critical; all we need is that they care about their own more than the well-
being of their offspring. To be more precise, if a mother takes the test, she
reduces her offspring’s ex ante expected utility by exposing them to premium
risk. This reduces an altruistic mother’s utility. Yet she gains directly from
her reduced premium. As long as the gain from the lower premium is higher
14Agents may also wish to take the test because they are concerned about their health
and optimal treatment; see, e.g., Doherty and Posey (1998).
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than the loss she experiences from making her offspring worse off, our results
continue to hold.
The cost of the test may also be positive. As long as the test cost is below
the profits made on the screened generations, our results still hold qualitatively.
Only when the test cost exceeds these profits, does inter-temporal screening
not pay.
We hope that despite these simplifying assumptions we shed some light
on how inter-temporal screening with genetic tests might work. We are able
to identify the winners and the losers compared to the unconditional pooling
situation. We highlight the assumptions necessary to support inter-temporal
screening. If, e.g., test results and insurance rates are verifiable and given
to the consumer, the process as described no longer works: Daughters of
good-gene carriers have proof of their low probability of becoming sick and
competition ensures that they get a fair rate. Thus, if one wants to rule out
inter-temporal screening, it suffices to give agents this information in a ver-
ifiable way. This might be another argument to give agents access to their
health records.
Appendix
In this Appendix we repeat the example scattered over the text in more detail.
We assume the following primitives: f(`) = 3/4, φ`` = 8/9, φhh = 2/3, ` = 1/4,
and h = 1/2; all other values follow from these primitives.
Agents are either of type ` or type h. This gives us immediately f(h) =
1/4, φh` = 1/9, and φ`h = 1/3.
The average probability of developing the disease in each generation is
p¯ = `f(`) + hf(h) = 5/16.
The probability that a daughter develops the disease given her mother was
of type ` is
p(b2|`1) = `φ`` + hφh` = 5/18;
if the mother was of type h, we compute
p(b2|h1) = `φ`h + hφhh = 5/12.
The probability that a granddaughter develops the disease given her grand-
mother was of type ` is
p(b3|`1) = `[φ``φ`` + φ`hφh`] +
h[φh`φ`` + φhhφh`] = 95/325;
15
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if the mother was of type h, we get
p(b3|h1) = `[φ``φ`h + φ`hφhh] +
h[φh`φ`h + φhhφhh] = 10/27.
Finally, the probability that a grand-granddaughter develops the disease
given her grand-grandmother was of type ` is
p(b4|`1) = `[φ``φ``φ`` + φ`hφh`φ`` +
φ``φ`hφh` + φ`hφhhφh`] +
h[φh`φ``φ`` + φhhφh`φ`` +
φh`φ`hφh` + φhhφhhφh`] = 220/729.
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